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Abstract.  
Deposit insurance is beneficial in that it ensures everyone has a safe 
method of storing and transferring money. That is a basic human 
right. Unfortunately deposit insurance also supports a commercial 
activity, namely depositing money at a bank with a view to the bank 
earning interest for the depositor, which a bank can only do by in 
effect lending out depositors’ money. That is just as commercial as 
depositing money with a stockbroker, mutual fund or unit trust with 
a view to interest or some other form of return being earned. And it 
is not the job of government to support commercial activities. As for 
the idea that banks create the money they lend out, rather than 
intermediate, that is dealt with in the opening paragraphs below.  
Preventing deposit insurance assisting the above commercial activity 
while retaining a form of totally safe deposits is easily done by 
splitting deposits into two types: first, those where the depositor 




the central bank where it earns no interest, and second, those where 
the depositor wants to be into commerce. Interest is earned on the 
latter deposits, but depositors carry the risk involved which 
essentially turns those deposits into equity.  And that is precisely 




1. The phrase “fractional reserve” refers here to the existing bank 
system: one where commercial banks are funded partially via equity 
and partially via deposits, with those deposits being protected by 
government run deposit insurance (DI). Plus only a “fraction” of 
deposits are matched by reserves held by commercial banks at the 
central bank. 
2.  “Full reserve banking” (also known as “narrow banking”, “100% 
reserve banking” and “Sovereign Money”) is used here in a 
conventional manner: to refer to a system where the bank industry is 
split in two. One half accepts deposits which are declared to be 
totally safe, but as befits that declaration, nothing remotely risky is 
done with those deposits. For example depositors’ money is simply 
lodged at the central bank. The second half of the industry (run by 




half) grants loans, but those loans are funded entirely by equity, not 
safe deposits. 
 
Do banks lend on depositors’ money?  
The first objection some readers may have to the above abstract is 
the above suggestion that banks lend on depositors’ money. The 
reason for that objection is that it has become popular recently to 
emphasise that commercial banks (henceforth just “banks”) create 
money when they lend rather than use depositors’ money to fund 
loans, or put another way, rather than intermediate between 
lender/depositors and borrowers.  
In fact as the second sentence of McLeay et al. (2014) explain, banks 
both create money and intermediate between lender/depositors 
and borrowers. And the reason banks do in fact intermediate can 
perhaps best be illustrated by considering a hypothetical bank which 
tries to simply create and lend out money without bothering to 
attract money from depositors, bond holders etc.  If a bank did that, 
most of the money loaned out would be deposited at other banks, 
who would then want reserves off the original bank so as to settle 
up. The original bank would then have to borrow reserves from other 




The only possible escape from the latter “bad position” would be if 
the loans the new bank made were far more profitable than normal 
for banks, in which case the new bank would be able to afford 
interest paid to other banks in respect of borrowed reserves. But it is  
risky for a bank to assume its loans will remain much more profitable 
than those of other banks. So the conclusion is that banks are, as 
McLeay et al. suggest very much into intermediation, i.e. lending on 
depositor’s money. 
 
Banks are not the only lenders. 
A second reservation some readers may have about the above 
abstract is that instead of placing safe money at the central bank, 
where it does nothing, it might seem that benefits would derive from 
putting that money to use, e.g. if that money, or at least some of it, 
was loaned out to borrowers.  
Unfortunately there are at least three flaws in the latter idea. First, 
as already intimated, the result is that government supports a 
commercial activity. The exact extent of that support can vary 
between DI which is run on strictly commercial lines and in contrast, 
DI run on a subsidised basis assisted by multi billion dollar loans at 




the Fed) in the aftermath of the 2007/8 bank crisis. The latter form 
of blatant subsidy for banks is clearly unjustified. 
 But even if support is limited to DI in the narrow sense of the phrase 
and run on strictly commercial lines, that is still not justified because 
banks are not the only form of lender. (Incidentally, if by any chance 
DI in whatever form provides no sort of boost at all for banks, then 
DI in its present form plus fractional reserve is a farce because it 
means accepting the downside of fractional reserve (bank crises etc) 
without any compensating advantage.  
As to lenders other than banks, there are pension funds, mutual 
funds, cash rich corporations and wealthy individuals who lend to 
corporations when they purchase corporate bonds. Plus there are 
millions of people who lend to small and medium size businesses run 
by family members or friends. Indeed, almost every firm in the 
country is a lender in that firms normally allow other firms a few 
weeks if not months before paying for goods delivered.  
Now if banks are given assistance in the form of DI provided by an 
insurer with an infinitely deep pocket (i.e. government), then other 
lenders should be free to avail themselves of that benefit, otherwise 
there will not be a level playing field as between different types of 
lender, as pointed out by Hoenig (no date given), former vice-




Of course the complexity and bureaucratic cost of offering taxpayer 
backed assistance for every type of lender would be horrendous. In 
short, the idea that banks or lenders in general should enjoy that sort 
of assistance amounts to entering a mine-field, which is strong 
evidence that the entire idea of taxpayer backed assistance for 
lenders of any sort, banks included, does not stand inspection.  
Moreover, the latter reductio ad absurdum gains support from the 
fact that government employed bureaucrats are easily fooled, with 
taxpayers footing the bill:  i.e. in a system where anyone holding 
liabilities of any firm (bank or non bank) can have those liabilities 
insured by the state against loss, everyone would try to have the 
state insure liabilities with hidden problems, while insuring liabilities 
which they know perfectly well to be safe themselves. That 
phenomenon, namely cheating taxpayers, is something that banks 
have proved themselves experts at over the decades. 
 
Bankers’ blandishments. 
Apart from bureaucrats, politicians have over the decades proved 
themselves incapable of resisting bankers’ blandishments. For 
example the finance industry in the UK spends about £100 million a 
year lobbying politicians (see Mathiason et al. (2012)). And as to the 




Hill “frankly they own the place” (see Watson (no date given).  That 
is, while a commercially viable DI system may sound desirable, the 
reality is that once it is introduced, bankers will very likely persuade 
politicians to charge them an insurance premium below the 
commercially viable rate. Indeed, up to quite recently, banks in the 
UK were not charged at all by government for DI: a complete farce! 
And for another and slightly different example of bankers’ 
blandishments working a treat, Sir John Vickers, chairman of the 
main UK investigation into banks in the wake of the 2007/8 bank 
crisis said, bank regulations are still not good enough (see Clements 
(2017).  
And the reason banks fool politicians so easily was set out very nicely 
by Paul Volker, former chairman of the Fed. As he put it, "Just about 
whatever anyone proposes, no matter what it is, the banks will come 
out and claim that it will restrict credit and harm the economy....It's 
all bullshit". 
In other words bankers only have to tell politicians that withdrawing 
any sort of featherbedding for banks will cut growth, and politicians 
believe it often as not! The trick there is obvious – well obvious to 
everyone apart from politicians. That is, it is perfectly true that if 
assistance for banks is withdraw then all else equal growth will fall. 
But of course all else does not need to be equal: that is, any 




via stimulus, monetary and/or fiscal. The net result would be much 
the same overall level of economic activity, but with less lending / 
debt based activity and more non lending / debt based activity.  
The conclusion is that as soon as governments offer any sort of 
assistance for banks, even just DI run on strictly commercial lines, 
bankers will try every trick in the book to get ever increasing 
amounts of taxpayers’ money from politicians, which is a good 
argument for abolishing all forms of government support for banks. 
 
The third flaw. 
The third flaw in the idea that the stock of safe money that exists 
under full reserve should be loaned out is that that stock has to be 
largely or wholly destroyed if it is in fact loaned out and for the 
following reasons. 
When DI was first introduced, the effect was to convert a significant 
amount of banks’ liabilities from what can legitimately be called  
“unsafe money / equity” into safe money, or if you like, “real 
money”. But that increased stock of money will have increased 
demand (all else equal) since peoples’ weekly spending varies with 
the size of their stock of money. Thus if the economy is at capacity 
when DI is introduced, government has to impose some sort of 




confiscating some of the private sector’s stock of money: presumably 
an amount that is more or less equal to the latter increased stock.  
To put that another way, full reserve certainly restricts what can be 
done with money, but it cannot be automatically concluded that any 
deflationary effect stemming from that is harmful, because 
increasing the stock of money to compensate for those restrictions is 
very easily done: new central bank created money can be created 
simply by pressing buttons on computer keyboards, which costs next 
to nothing. Conversely, abandoning full reserve and reverting to 
fractional reserve plus DI does not mean large amounts of extra 
money becomes available to spend or invest. The reality is that much 
of, or all of that money has to be withdraw.   
 
We’ve had totally safe accounts for decades. 
Another minor point in favour of totally safe accounts is that such 
accounts have actually been available for decades if not centuries 
without causing any obvious problems. For example there are state 
run savings banks in some countries (“National Savings and 
Investments” in the UK). NSI accounts are not quite as flexible as 
normal bank accounts, for example they do not offer debit cards, but 
there is no reason they should not, and if they did, then NSI accounts 




And apart from NSI type accounts, the wealthier section of the 
population have always been free to buy government debt, which (at 
a stretch) is a form of totally safe account.  And as to the US, the 
function performed by NSI is performed by mutual funds which 
invest just in government debt.   
 
Deposit insurance hits the innocent.  
Another problem with DI is as follows. The popular and naïve view of 
DI is that government stores up money it earns from insurance 
premiums in good years and then pays out money from that store in 
years when there are more than the usual number of bank failures. 
But there’s a problem there, as follows. 
Governments also attempt to minimise unemployment in as far as is 
compatible with hitting the inflation target, i.e. governments try to 
bring about full employment in the latter sense. Now assuming 
government more or less achieves that objective and it then has to 
spend more than the usual amount by way of compensation for 
depositors who would otherwise lose their money, then government 
will have to rein in spending in other areas, or raise taxes if demand 





But that’s a blatant injustice: it involves people who have had 
nothing to do with silly loans suffering the inconvenience of their 
take home pay fluctuating. Now who should be made to suffer the 
latter inconvenience?  Should it be people who have had nothing to 
do with granting or taking out those loans, or should it be those 
responsible for such loans, i.e. those who have funded the loans or 
taken out the loans? 
Well it’s pretty obviously those responsible for loans who should 
bear the inconvenience. If I sign a contract with a decorator to re-
decorate my house and the decorator makes a hash of it, there is no 
obligation on the community at large to compensate me. It was my 
fault for not doing enough checks on the decorator.  
Indeed, perhaps the most glaring example of those who have had 
nothing to do with bank incompetence being made to bear the cost 
came in the aftermath of the 2007/8 bank crisis: government and 
central banks dished out billions to Wall Street bankers, money 
which could have gone to those who suffered the consequences of 
bank incompetence, i.e. those on Main Street. Of course that form of 
support for banks was not DI strictly speaking, but it certainly was 





Moreover, it is not only justice or injustice that is involved in the 
above question as to who should bear the cost when lenders and 
borrowers make a hash of it: there is also a strictly economic point 
here, and as follows. 
 
The free market involves voluntary participation.  
DI in its present form is not a free market arrangement. Reason for 
that is that a free market is a system where all participants do so 
voluntarily, and it is widely accepted in economics that free markets 
maximise GDP, except where it can be shown that aspects of the 
market are quite clearly not maximising GDP: for example where 
externalities arise. 
In other words if those who wanted their deposits to be insured took 
out insurance with a private sector insurance company, that would 
be an entirely voluntary arrangement: in bad years, shareholders in 
the insurance company would be hit, but they would have no reason 
to complain because that is what they signed up for when buying 
shares in the insurance company. 
In contrast, state run DI involves coercion: a proportion of those who 
are hit in bad years (e.g. the above mentioned residents of Main 
Street) have no choice but to take a hit. That is not a free market 




arrangement which does not maximise GDP.  (Or for those who do 
not want to see GDP increased for environmental reasons, an 
alternative “not unreasonable assumption” is that “that is an 
arrangement which does not” maximise output per hour with the 
average number of hours worked per week being cut pari passu.) 
 
Similarities to health insurance. 
It might seem there is a flaw in the latter insurance point, as follows.  
It might seem that DI is similar to state run health insurance, like the 
National Health Service in the UK.  With NHS type systems, obviously 
those who are not responsible for particular illnesses sometimes find 
themselves footing the bill for those illnesses, the current Covid virus 
being an example.  
But there is an important difference between DI and NHS type 
systems. NHS type systems were set up for moral or social reasons, 
not commercial reasons. That is, the view of the population at large 
(in the case of the UK just after WWII) was that some sort of basic 
medical attention was a human right.  
But that type of social point cannot be applied directly to DI because 
DI is partly about matters commercial: i.e. government support for 





In particular, and to repeat, where anyone deposits money at a bank 
with a view to the bank earning them interest, that is every bit as 
commercial as depositing money with a stock broker, mutual fund, 
unit trust etc for the same purpose.   
 
Uninsured deposits. 
Having argued above against letting banks fund loans via insured 
deposits it is clearly of relevance to mention what is in some senses a 
relatively new form of money, namely uninsured deposits. Some US 
banks have recently applied for the right to issue such deposits 
(Martens and Martens (2020).   
Those non government backed “promises to pay” (i.e. deposits) 
would seem to be a legitimate free market activity, as long as it is 
made very clear to anyone invited to hold that money that there is 
no government backing. 
Also those uninsured deposits are not as novel as they might seem. 
Bank issued money is a promise to pay base money, and uninsured 
promises to pay are actually very common. For example bonds 
issued by corporations are uninsured promises to pay. Plus when one 




gives the first a promise to pay. Plus there is Bitcoin which, if not a 
promise to pay, is certainly an uninsured form of money.  
To summarise, uninsured deposits would seem to be a legitimate 
free market phenomenon, as long as they are clearly and openly 
declared to be uninsured. What would certainly be unacceptable 
would be a return to the days prior to the introduction of DI when 
banks suggested that deposits were safe, when in fact they quite 
clearly were not, because those banks were at the same time lending 
out money, which meant that when unwise loans were made, banks 
could not repay depositors their money. 
 
Objections to full reserve. 
A large number of objections have of course been raised to full 
reserve banking. Those objections are very easily demolished, and I 
demolished large numbers of them in section two of Musgrave 
(2018). Plus some risible arguments were put by Mervyn King, 
former governor of the Bank of England and by Charles Goodhart, 
former member of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee 







It has long been obvious that there is something seriously wrong 
with our bank system. Hopefully the above paragraphs have put  
some good arguments for the full reserve banking solution, a 
solution supported by many economists – see Musgrave (2020c) for 
a list of them. Full reserve disposes of the subsidy for banks that is 
inherent to full reserve plus deposit insurance. Plus under full 
reserve, bank failures are impossible because if a bank makes silly 
loans, all that happens is that the value of its shares decline: the 
bank does not actually go bust. That of course would not totally 
dispose of “boom and bust”, in the form of 2007/8 type bank crises 
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